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Biases in Interpretation and Memory in Generalized Social Phobia
Paula T. Hertel
Trinity University
Faith Brozovich, Jutta Joormann, and Ian H. Gotlib
Stanford University
Two experiments examined the link between interpretation and memory in individuals diagnosed with
Generalized Social Phobia (GSP). In Experiment 1, GSP and control participants generated continuations
for nonsocial and ambiguous social scenarios. GSP participants produced more socially anxious and
negative continuations for the social scenarios than did the controls. On the subsequent test of recalling
the social scenarios, intrusion errors that shared meaning with the original continuations were made more
frequently by the GSP group, producing false recall with emotionally negative features. To examine
whether nonanxious individuals would also produce such errors if given emotional interpretations, in
Experiment 2 the authors asked university students to read the scenarios plus endings produced by GSP
participants in Experiment 1. The students either constructed vivid mental images of themselves as the
main characters or thought about whether the endings provided closure. Low-anxious students in the
closure condition produced fewer ending-based intrusions in recalling the social scenarios than did
students in the other 3 conditions. Results illustrate the importance of examining the nature of source-
monitoring errors in investigations of memory biases in social anxiety.
Keywords: social anxiety, social phobia, memory, interpretation
Recent models of cognitive processing in social phobia serve as
useful frameworks for understanding how socially anxious indi-
viduals interpret and remember social events (Clark & Wells,
1995; Rapee & Heimberg, 1997). The frameworks predict that
when individuals with social anxiety are confronted with new
social situations, they tend to interpret them in a threatening
manner because of established negative assumptions and experi-
ence a variety of negative consequences such as increases in
anxiety and physical symptoms. The frameworks also suggest that
socially anxious individuals selectively remember and brood about
negative self-relevant aspects of social events. Postevent rumina-
tion presumably contributes to an increase in socially anxious
individuals’ anticipatory anxiety and strengthens avoidance strat-
egies for future social interactions. Although there is considerable
evidence for biased interpretations in social anxiety, evidence
supporting the sort of memory bias implied by postevent rumina-
tion is scant.
Researchers have used a variety of paradigms to examine interpre-
tation biases in socially anxious individuals. The overwhelming ma-
jority of studies have found negative interpretation biases for social
scenarios both in individuals with high levels of social anxiety (e.g.,
Amir, Beard, & Bower, 2005; Brendle & Wenzel, 2004; Mellings &
Alden, 2000; Voncken, Bogels, & de Vries, 2003; Wenzel, Finstrom,
Jordan, & Brendle, 2005) and in clinically diagnosed samples (e.g.,
Amir, Foa, & Coles, 1998; Stopa & Clark, 2000). Even when evi-
dence for a negative bias was not obtained, investigators have found
that individuals with high levels of social anxiety (e.g., Brendle &
Wenzel, 2004; Constans, Penn, Ihen, & Hope, 1999; Hirsch &
Mathews, 1997) and individuals who are diagnosed with social pho-
bia (Hirsch & Mathews, 2000) lack the positive interpretation bias
that is typically exhibited by nonanxious control participants. Thus, it
is clear that socially anxious individuals interpret ambiguous social
material in a more negative or less positive manner than do their
nonanxious counterparts.
In contrast to the literature on interpretive biases, however, most
studies have not found evidence of memory bias either in highly
anxious participants (e.g., Brendle & Wenzel, 2004; Constans et
al., 1999; Sanz, 1996; Wenzel et al., 2005) or in clinical samples
(e.g., Amir, Coles, Brigidi, & Foa, 2001; Becker, Roth, Andrich, &
Margraf, 1999; Cloitre, Cancienne, Heimberg, Holt, & Liebowitz,
1995; Rapee, McCallum, Melville, Ravenscroft, & Rodney, 1994;
Rinck & Becker, 2005). Two exceptions to this pattern were
obtained in investigations of implicit memory, in which deliberate
focus on the past was not involved (Amir, Foa, & Coles, 2000;
Lundh & Ost, 1997).
Three additional exceptions to the usual lack of memory bias in
social phobia were found in studies using explicit memory tests,
and the results of these investigations offer clues concerning the
conditions that contribute to the bias. First, Mansell and Clark
(1999) threatened high and low socially anxious participants with
the prospect of giving an impromptu speech before they completed
a memory task. These socially anxious participants exhibited re-
duced recall of positive public self-referent words. Similarly, the
procedure used by Mellings and Alden (2000) included a social
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interaction with a confederate, followed by a request to recall the
interaction on the next day. Socially anxious participants who were
asked to ruminate and to focus on themselves before the recall task
recalled fewer partner-related and more negative self-related as-
pects. These findings indicate that the induction of self-focus may
be important in generating a memory bias. Finally, using a face-
recognition task, Lundh and Ost (1996) found that socially phobic
participants remembered more faces that they had previously
judged to be critical (instead of accepting), whereas the opposite
was found for the control participants. This finding suggests that it
is important to consider participants’ initial interpretations of the
social stimuli while examining memory biases.
The present study was designed to investigate more systemati-
cally the connection between interpretation of social events and
memory biases in social phobia. A long tradition of research on
constructive and reconstructive memory, beginning with Bartlett
(1932), has demonstrated connections between the ways in which
social events are understood and how they are subsequently re-
membered. Further, research on reality monitoring (Johnson &
Raye, 1981) has demonstrated that memory errors can be caused
by failures to distinguish between externally and internally gener-
ated events at the time of remembering. If socially anxious people
experience reality-monitoring confusions, they would tend to re-
construct their memory for (externally generated) social situations
partly on the basis of their (internally generated) interpretations. In
short, memory biases should become evident when both initial
interpretations and monitoring errors are taken into account. We
propose that a lack of attention to possible confusions regarding
the source of memories is an important reason why most studies
have not found memory biases to be associated with social anxiety.
To measure interpretations, we asked participants to provide con-
tinuations for ambiguous social scenarios (interspersed with nonam-
biguous nonsocial scenarios) and, subsequently, to remember both the
scenarios and their continuations. To encourage socially anxious
thoughts, we included two additional features in the design prior to the
presentation of scenarios. First, we staged a conversation between the
participants and a confederate with the intention of inducing self-
focus and active social anxiety in the socially anxious participants (see
Mansell & Clark, 1999; Mellings & Alden, 2000). Second, we varied
the degree of self-focus following that conversation by using a
thought-induction task: rumination or distraction (a modification of
tasks used by Nolen-Hoeksema & Morrow, 1993). We predicted that
the rumination condition would produce clearer evidence of interpre-
tation bias in social anxiety.
On the basis of previous evidence for interpretation bias in
social anxiety, we expected that participants diagnosed with Gen-
eralized Social Phobia (GSP) would generate more socially anx-
ious continuations to the ambiguous social scenarios than would
control participants. Then, to investigate memory bias, we exam-
ined recalled scenarios for the possibility of threat-related bias in
the GSP group. In place of a more traditional emphasis on condi-
tions for accurate recall, our interest centered on the nature of
memory errors or intrusions. We predicted that GSP participants
would produce more intrusions that reflect the nature of their
socially anxious continuations, blurring the distinction between
memory for the scenario and memory for their own interpretations.
In real-world settings, these intrusions constitute errors in reality
monitoring. Because we presented verbal descriptions in place of
actual situations, however, we conceptualize errors in distinguish-
ing between memory for those descriptions and participants’ sub-
sequent interpretations as source-monitoring errors.
Experiment 1
Method
Participants and Design
Potential participants responded to Internet advertisements
posted on a highly frequented website for the San Francisco Bay
area concerning paid research opportunities at Stanford University.
Readers were asked to respond if they avoided social situations
and if they often worried about being embarrassed or humiliated in
public (or if they never had these experiences). Respondents were
interviewed over the telephone as an initial screening procedure.
Trained research assistants administered the telephone interview,
which took approximately 30 min and included portions of the
Structured Clinical Interview (SCID; First, Spitzer, Gibbon, &
Williams, 1997) for the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of
Mental Disorders (4th ed.; DSM–IV; American Psychiatric Asso-
ciation, 1994). Individuals who reported experiencing severe head
trauma, neurological disorders such as Parkinson’s disease, learn-
ing disabilities, any psychotic symptoms during their lifetime, or
alcohol or substance abuse or dependence within the last 6 months
were excluded from further participation. Individuals who were
likely to meet criteria for GSP or who appeared to be never-
disordered were invited to come to the laboratory for a more
extensive interview.
Potential participants were interviewed in person using the
SCID and were assigned to the GSP group if they met DSM–IV
criteria for a diagnosis of GSP. Because cognitive discrepancies in
the social anxiety literature might in part be associated with
comorbidity, individuals who met GSP criteria were excluded if
they also met DSM–IV criteria for current Major Depressive Dis-
order or Bipolar Disorder. (Axis II disorders were not assessed.)
As a result, Axis I comorbidity in our final sample was low. Of the
32 GSP participants, 1 was diagnosed with obsessive-compulsive
disorder, 2 with dysthymia, 1 with agoraphobia without panic
disorder, and 1 with generalized anxiety disorder. To be eligible
for inclusion in the control group, the interviewer confirmed that
the individual had no lifetime history of Axis I disorders. Individ-
uals who met these inclusion criteria were scheduled for a second
session during the following week. The final sample consisted of
64 participants (20 women and 12 men in both the GSP group and
control group).
Materials
Thought-induction materials. The rumination and distraction
materials from Nolen-Hoeksema and Morrow (1993) were modi-
fied and used to induce rumination or distraction following the
participant’s interaction with the confederate. We selected 14
phrases from each set for the participants to “concentrate on and
think about” during an 8-min period. The phrases selected for
rumination typified self-evaluative thought processes of socially
anxious individuals following a social interaction (e.g., why you
react the way you do, what people notice about your personality,
how similar/different you are relative to other people). In contrast,
individuals in the distraction induction were asked to concentrate
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on external images or objects that were not related to the self (e.g.,
a boat slowly crossing the Atlantic, the shape of a large black
umbrella, the structure of a high-rise building).
Scenarios. Ten social and 10 nonsocial scenarios were cre-
ated; some were adapted from Mathews and Mackintosh (2000),
and others were developed by Faith Brozovich. Each scenario
ended abruptly and thereby provided the occasion for a participant-
created ending. The social scenarios were ambiguous in terms of
possible threatening or nonthreatening interpretations, which we
purported to infer from the participants’ endings. One such sce-
nario was “The Wedding Reception” (from Mathews & Mackin-
tosh, 2000, p.604):
Your friend asks you to give a speech at her wedding reception. You
prepare some remarks and when the time comes, get to your feet. As
you speak, some people in the audience start to laugh.
We used nonsocial scenarios in order to make our interests less
obvious. One of our newly developed nonsocial scenarios was
“Your New CD”:
You heard a song on the radio and went out to buy the CD right away.
When you return home you listen to it on your stereo and turn the
volume up. After a few songs, you regret the purchase.
Each scenario was composed of three sentences; together, the
second and third sentences expressed a total of five idea units. For
example, “The Wedding Reception” included the following: pre-
pare remarks, it is time, get to your feet, you speak, people laugh.
“The New CD” included the following: return home, listen to the
CD, turn up the volume, after a few songs, regret purchase. All
computer tasks were implemented with E-Prime software (Version
1.1.4.1, Psychology Software Tools, Inc.).
Questionnaires. Participants completed a “personal-
characteristics” questionnaire at four time points throughout the
session; they rated their current levels of anxiety and nervousness
on Likert scales (e.g., 1  not anxious, 9  very anxious). We
disguised our focus on anxiety by including filler items (e.g., tired,
curious, and dreamy). Participants also completed a series of
questionnaires often used in cognitive studies of social anxiety: the
Post-Event Processing Questionnaire (PEP; Rachman, Gruter-
Andrew, & Shafran, 2000) that assesses how much and how often
participants engaged in rumination following a social event in the
last few months; the Fear of Negative Evaluation Scale (FNE;
Watson & Friend, 1969), a 30-item true/false questionnaire that
asks participants to indicate how often they negatively evaluate
themselves or fear that others are doing so in social situations; the
Social Avoidance and Distress Scale (SADS; Watson & Friend,
1969), a 28-item true/false questionnaire that asks participants to
evaluate their feelings following typical social situations based on
their personal experiences; and the Social Phobia Anxiety Inven-
tory (SPAI; Turner, Beidel, Dancu, & Stanley, 1989), a frequently
used measure assessing severity of social anxiety symptoms.
Procedure
Upon arrival, each participant was taken to a waiting room,
having been told that the session was delayed due to a previous
participant’s late arrival. The first personal-characteristics ques-
tionnaire was administered; shortly thereafter, an opposite-sex
confederate entered the room and began a 10-min conversation
with the participant. The confederate discussed a scripted list of
topics and questions (e.g., the confederate’s job and restaurants
and museums in the Bay area, because the confederate had sup-
posedly just moved there). Following the conversation, the exper-
imenter took the participant to the computer room. The experi-
menter described the session as a series of short experiments that
focused on concentration, memory, and imagination. Participants
then completed the second personal-characteristics questionnaire.
For all of the computer tasks, the experimenter read aloud the
instructions (which were also presented on the computer) and
queried to ensure that the participant understood them. All mate-
rials were presented in black font on a white background.
Thought inductions. In the first task, participants received
either the rumination or distraction induction and were told that
this task concerned their ability to concentrate. They were in-
structed to use their imagination and concentration to focus on the
idea represented by each phrase. The experimenter then left the
room, and each of the 14 phrases appeared for 30 s, followed by a
Likert scale ranging from 1–7; the participants used the keyboard
to rate their level of concentration. The program then advanced to
the next phrase. The induction task took approximately 8 min to
complete, after which participants filled out the third personal-
characteristics questionnaire.
Scenarios. Next, participants were presented with the scenar-
ios, one at a time, on the computer screen. The title appeared on the
first line, with the text immediately below. Participants were asked
to imagine themselves as the central character of each scenario and
to generate at least one additional sentence to finish each story.
Once they had silently read the scenario on the screen, they said
aloud the first ending to the story that came to mind, and these
responses—termed continuations—were recorded on audiotape.
Participants completed three practice trials with nonsocial scenar-
ios while the experimenter was in the room to ensure that they
understood the procedure. After the experimenter left the room, the
20 test scenarios were presented in random order and self-paced. A
3-min digit/symbol-substitution task from the Wechsler Adult In-
telligence Scale—Revised (WAIS-R; Wechsler, 1981) separated
the interpretation task from the memory task.
Memory task. We cued recall of each scenario by presenting
its first sentence, and then we asked participants to recall aloud the
remaining two sentences in the scenario. After the participants had
finished recalling the scenario, they pressed the space bar, advanc-
ing the program to the next screen, which prompted them to recall
their own ending. They said the words “my ending” aloud before
reporting recall of the continuation. Once again, participants prac-
ticed the procedure with the three nonsocial practice scenarios
while the experimenter was still in the room and then performed
the randomized test trials alone at their own pace.
Questionnaires. At the end of the session, participants com-
pleted a packet of questionnaires including the final personal-
characteristics questionnaire, PEP, SADS, FNE, and SPAI, in
that order. They received a partial debriefing if they asked about
the confederate interaction. Otherwise, they received a full
debriefing 1 week later during a follow-up phone call. The
session lasted between 60 and 90 min, and participants were
paid $25 per hour.
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Coding and Scoring Procedures
Three raters coded the participants’ continuations of the scenar-
ios as belonging to one of five categories: socially anxious, anx-
ious, other negative, neutral, or positive. The socially anxious
category was used when the participant continued the scenario by
expressing fear of embarrassment, fear of being observed or
judged by others, or discomfort involving other people in the
situation (e.g., I feel so embarrassed at this party). This category
also included the experience of physical symptoms that were
related to the social situation (e.g., I can feel my face turning red
while I’m talking). The anxious category was used if the person
expressed anxiety that was not particularly related to the social
situation (e.g., I’m having problems breathing). The “otherwise
negative” category was used for continuations that reflected neg-
ative thoughts and feelings unrelated to anxiety (e.g., I feel so
bad—this happens all the time). Continuations were rated as neu-
tral if they did not reflect emotion or symptoms of disorders (e.g.,
people are always late). Finally, the positive category was used for
continuations that reflected some positive emotion (e.g., I am so
glad because I have time to read my book now). Measures of
agreement were computed for each scenario and each pair of raters
(average   .69).
A recalled social scenario was scored as containing at least one
intrusion if the protocol contained any new term that had not been
presented originally; interclass correlation coefficient (ICC) .83.
The raters noted whether the intrusion reflected the meaning of the
initial continuation; if it did, they classified the intrusion as be-
longing to that same category of emotion. Table 1 contains exam-
ples of scenarios recalled with intrusions that reflect the meaning
of the corresponding continuation. Because inspection of the in-
trusion data revealed problems with the data from one rater,
analyses of recall intrusions are based on data averaged across the
other two raters (  .64).
Results and Discussion
Table 2 presents information about the demographic and clinical
characteristics of participants in the GSP and control groups.
Participants in the two groups did not differ significantly on any of
the demographic variables, p  .15. As expected given our selec-
tion criteria, the two groups differed on all of the measures of
anxiety, p  .001.
For measures of interpretation and recall bias, separate analyses
of variance (ANOVAs) were conducted on the percentages of the
10 social scenarios within each emotion category, due to lack of
independence across categories. Because raters rarely used the
“other anxious” category (see Table 3), data from that category
were not analyzed. Each analysis included between-subjects fac-
tors for group (GSP vs. control) and thought induction (rumination
vs. distraction). The significance level was set at .05. Unreported
effects were nonsignificant, p  .15. Effects associated with
thought induction were nonsignificant (and discussed more fully in
a subsequent section).
Table 1
Examples of Social Scenarios, Continuations, and Recall
Scenario
GSP CONTROL
Continuation Recalled scenario Continuation Recalled scenario
You are invited to attend
a social at a local club,
whose members you
don’t know very well.
As you approach the
door you hear loud
conversation. When you
enter the room, it stops.
I guess I look pretty weird
in the club. I’m not the
typical person you’d
find at a club. (socially
anxious)
When I come in they all stop
and stare at me. (socially
anxious intrusion)
I nod as a form of greeting,
sit down quietly and wait
for the conversation to
begin again. (neutral)
While approaching the
door, I hear loud
conversation. When
I enter the room,
however, the
conversation ends.
(no intrusion)
Your friend asks you to
give a speech at her
wedding reception. You
prepare some remarks
and when the time
comes, get to your feet.
As you speak, some
people in the audience
start to laugh.
I’ll wrap up my speech as
quickly as I can, as I
fear that they are
laughing at me.
(socially anxious)
You spend many hours
rehearsing what you need
to say, and when the time
comes you get up and
make your speech. As you
start speaking you realize
that people are laughing at
you. (socially anxious
intrusion)
You ignore them and keep
going with your speech.
(neutral)
You have your speech
ready and you get
up to talk, and you
hear people in the
crowd laughing. (no
intrusion)
You see a job advertised
that you would really
like, so you apply and
are asked to interview.
At the interview, you
answer the questions as
well as you can. That
evening, you think that
your answers decided
the outcome.
I figure I probably didn’t
get the job because I
never have the answers
that interviewers seem
to want to hear. (other
negative)
You answer the questions as
best you can and after the
interview you think that
your answers will
determine the outcome of
whether or not you will
get the job. (no intrusion)
I’m looking forward to
hearing from the
interview regardless of
whether I got it or not. I
think interviewing is a
good experience and I
need more of it.
(positive)
I answer the questions
to the best of my
ability and then I go
home, thinking that
I did a good job of
answering the
questions (positive
intrusion)
Note. The first sentence of the scenario was provided to cue recall. GSP  Generalized Social Phobia.
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Initial Interpretation of Social Scenarios
Table 3 contains mean percentages of social scenarios that were
interpreted within each emotion category. The means are collapsed
across conditions of thought-induction procedures.
Socially anxious and otherwise negative continuations. So-
cially anxious participants produced significantly more socially
anxious continuations to the ambiguous social scenarios than did
the controls, F(1, 60) 23.16, MSE 206.55, p .001, 2 .28.
Continuations of social scenarios coded as other negative were
also produced more frequently by the GSP participants than by the
controls, F(1, 60)  7.85, MSE  90.62, p  .007, 2  .12.
Neutral and positive continuations. The analysis of continua-
tions to social scenarios coded as neutral yielded a significant main
effect for group, F(1, 60) 13.33, MSE 385.26, p .001, 2 
.18; control participants produced more neutral continuations than
did GSP participants. In addition, the analysis of positive contin-
uations to social scenarios revealed a main effect for group that
approached significance, F(1, 60)  3.96, MSE  152.72, p 
.051, 2  .06: control participants generated more positive inter-
pretations than did GSP participants.1
Memory Intrusions
The raters scored an intrusion in recall of social scenarios if
participants included nonpresented details; intrusions therefore
ranged from 0 to 10. In the analysis of overall percentage of
intrusions, regardless of their meaning, we found a main effect for
group that approached significance, F(1, 60)  3.10, MSE 
354.04, p  .083, 2  .05. A greater percentage of the social
scenarios recalled by the controls contained intrusions than did
those recalled by GSP participants (M  49.1 vs. 40.8, respec-
tively). Thus, socially anxious participants were clearly not less
accurate in general than were controls.
Next, we analyzed the percentage of intrusions in recalling
social scenarios that reflected the meaning of the corresponding
continuations. If socially anxious participants experience greater
difficulty in making memorial distinctions between social events
and their interpretations, their recall of social scenarios should
contain more intrusions that reflect their initial interpretations of
the scenarios. Indeed, the main effect for group was significant,
F(1, 60)  6.67, MSE  468.70, p  .012, 2  .10. The GSP
participants produced more of these intrusions (M 34.4) than did
the control participants (M  20.5). The question still remains,
however: Were GSP participants’ memory difficulties restricted to
situations that had evoked emotionally negative interpretations?
To answer this question, we recorded the category of the initial
continuation that corresponded to each intrusion in the recall of
social scenarios. The dependent variable was the percentage of
intrusions that reflected continuations according to each emotion
category, separately. Table 4 presents these means, collapsed
across induction condition. In the category of social anxiety, the
analysis yielded a main effect for group that approached signifi-
cance, F(1, 60)  3.95, MSE 140.12, p  .051, 2  .06. A
similar group difference was obtained in the “other negative”
category, F(1, 60)  5.11, MSE  237.33, p  .027, 2  .08.
Differences in the neutral and positive categories were nonsignif-
icant ( p  .544 and .399, respectively). In short, GSP participants
produced a larger percentage of intrusions that reflected emotion-
ally negative continuations but not other types.
We also analyzed the percentage of the five idea units accurately
recalled from social scenarios (across raters, ICC  .96). GSP
participants recalled 47.8, on average, whereas the controls re-
called 45.0. This group difference was nonsignificant, F  1.0.
The main point, however, is that GSP participants’ source-
monitoring errors were not accompanied by poorer memory for the
details.
Mood Measures and the Failure of the Thought-Induction
Manipulation
Scores on the personal-characteristics questionnaire consisted of
ratings of anxiety and nervousness throughout the session and
were used to indicate any change in anxiety levels across the four
administration time points: the beginning of the session, following
the social interaction, after the induction, and at the end of the
session. These ratings served to test the efficacy of the thought-
induction manipulation with respect to mood. The dependent vari-
able for this analysis was the mean of the anxiety and nervousness
ratings at each point. A mixed-design ANOVA was conducted,
with a within-subjects factor for time (the four times of adminis-
tration) and between-subjects factors for group and thought induc-
tion. The analysis revealed a significant main effect for time, F(3,
174.64)  7.57, MSE  0.60, p  .001, 2  .11.2 Change within
pairs of adjacent time periods was evaluated; the only significant
change occurred between ratings following the conversation with
the confederate and ratings following the induction, F(1, 60) 
8.89, MSE  .93, p  .004, 2  .13 (M  3.2 beginning of the
1 Continuations to the nonsocial scenarios, included as fillers, were
examined in an exploratory query about the specificity of our results. These
scenarios did not lend themselves to threatening interpretations, and so-
cially anxious continuations were almost nonexistent (M  0.15%). Con-
trols and GSP groups produced similar levels of other-negative, neutral,
and positive continuations, p  .20. We also examined the classifications
of recalled social-scenario continuations according to emotion categories.
The pattern of continuation recall was identical to the pattern of initial
interpretations.
2 Degrees of freedom are those associated with the Huynh-Feldt adjust-
ment, due to violations of the sphericity assumption.
Table 2
Characteristics of the Samples, Experiment 1
Variable
Generalized Social
Phobia Control
Gender 20 F, 12 M 20 F, 12 M
Age in years M (SD) 31.4 (10.48) 34.9 (11.05)
College graduate 59.4% 75.0%
English 1st lang 87.5% 93.8%
Comorbid Dx 15.6%
PEP M (SD) 53.9 (17.81) 21.2 (15.38)
SADS M (SD) 21.9 (4.09) 4.2 (3.81)
FNE M (SD) 25.0 (6.25) 7.0 (6.39)
SPAI M (SD) 133.4 (28.45) 45.2 (26.99)
Note. n  32. English 1st lang  percentage of native English speakers;
Comorbid Dx  current comorbid diagnoses; PEP  Postevent Processing
Questionnaire; SADS Social Avoidance and Distress Scale; FNE Fear
of Negative Evaluation Scale; SPAI  Social Phobia Anxiety Inventory.
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session, M  3.0 following the conversation, M  2.6 following
the induction, M 2.7 end of the session). Regardless of induction
task or group, participants became less anxious or nervous. There
was also a significant main effect for group, F(1, 60)  54.96,
MSE  6.14, p  .001, 2  .41. As expected, the GSP partici-
pants rated anxiety and nervousness to be higher overall than did
controls (M  4.0 vs. 1.7, respectively). However, all effects
associated with induction were nonsignificant, Fs  1.0.
In employing a thought-induction procedure prior to requesting
interpretations of scenarios, we expected to find that ruminative
thought would exaggerate socially anxious biases in interpretations
and, perhaps, in subsequent recall, or that distracting thoughts
would reduce these biases. We did not find these effects. More-
over, the manipulation did not affect current mood states, as has
the standard manipulation devised by Nolen-Hoeksema and Mor-
row (1993) and since used by others. In hindsight, the manipula-
tion of rumination was weak. We used the 14 ruminative phrases
that pertained most directly to the concerns of socially anxious
individuals and presented each one for 30 s, in order to fill the
(typical) 8-min period. Such an extended period likely permitted
mind wandering. Thus, poor experimental control might explain
the lack of effects of this procedure on measures of mood and
cognitive bias. Future studies should pay particular attention to
parameters of the manipulation of ruminative thought in order to
maximize the success of this manipulation.
Summary
The main findings of Experiment 1 were (a) the replication of
the frequently demonstrated interpretation bias in social phobia,
and (b) new evidence for memory bias. GSP participants, more
frequently than controls, produced intrusions in recalling social
scenarios that reflected the meaning of their initial emotionally
negative continuations. Various explanations might account for
these source-monitoring errors. At first blush it might seem that
attention to the details of the episode could be sacrificed in the
service of attention to one’s own reactions (Hope, Heimberg, &
Klein, 1990). Similarly, the mere elicitation of emotion might
divert the focus of attention from the actual description. Accounts
based on inattention, however, are challenged by the finding that
the two groups recalled similar numbers of idea units. In a different
vein, because mental imagery characterizes the thoughts of so-
cially anxious individuals in social situations (see Hirsch, Clark, &
Mathews, 2006), source-monitoring errors might reflect the extent
to which people construct vivid mental images of themselves in the
scenario and the subsequent continuation. Imagery would serve to
integrate the continuation with the scenario.
Experiment 2
In an initial attempt to examine the role of imagery in producing
source-monitoring errors, we selected emotional continuations re-
ported by the GSP participants in Experiment 1 to present to
university students in Experiment 2. We chose four socially anx-
ious and four otherwise negative continuations, each of which had
produced an intrusion in later recall of the corresponding scenar-
ios. Neutral or slightly positive continuations of eight nonsocial
scenarios were also presented. Students read the separated scenar-
ios and endings under instructions either to form self-referential
images or to consider the extent of closure provided by the ending.
On the basis of the combined cognitive-biases hypothesis (Hirsch,
Clark, & Mathews, 2006), we predicted that the construction of
self-referential images would elevate intrusions.
Even more fundamentally, however, this experiment was con-
ducted to evaluate whether intrusions of the sort produced in
Experiment 1 by the GSP participants would also be produced
when nonanxious individuals recall social scenarios with emo-
tional continuations; consequently, we categorized students as low
or high on a measure of social anxiety. If nonanxious and anxious
participants produced similarly frequent intrusions, then we would
not be able to rule out the sufficiency of emotional continuations
(perhaps combined with imagery) in producing source-monitoring
errors. If the two groups similarly failed to produce intrusions, we
would suspect that self-generated interpretations are necessary for
Table 3
Mean Percentages of Continuations (and Standard Deviations), Experiment 1
Group
Emotion category
Socially anxious Anxious Other negative Neutral Positive
Control 7.8 (7.97) 1.1 (3.55) 6.7 (6.93) 65.4 (16.46) 16.6 (14.12)
GSP 25.1 (18.61) 1.7 (3.05) 13.3 (11.30) 47.5 (21.82) 10.4 (10.12)
Note. n  32. GSP  Generalized Social Phobia.
Table 4
Mean Percentages of Intrusions in Recall, Reflecting Interpretations of Social Scenarios (and Standard Deviations), Experiment 1
Group
Emotion category
Socially anxious Anxious Other negative Neutral Positive Total
Control 4.2 (8.10) 0.3 (1.47) 2.3 (4.63) 10.6 (12.17) 2.6 (5.91) 20.5 (16.20)
GSP 10.1 (14.45) 0.5 (2.74) 11.0 (21.26) 8.6 (13.58) 4.2 (9.07) 34.4 (26.34)
Note. n  32. GSP  Generalized Social Phobia.
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the production of source-monitoring errors. Finally, differences
between these groups would signal the importance of social anx-
iety in producing these errors, perhaps because mental imagery is
typically involved (Hirsch, Clark, & Mathews, 2006).
Method
Participants and Materials
Fifty-six students were recruited from an introductory psychol-
ogy course at Trinity University in San Antonio, Texas. The Social
Interaction Anxiety Scale (SIAS; Mattick & Clarke, 1998) had
previously been administered, and students qualified for participa-
tion if they scored below 20 and above 30 (values arbitrarily
chosen to differentiate the groups). Table 5 presents the mean
scores in each condition. Because data from four students could
not be used due to problems during tape recording, their data were
replaced with the data from an additional four participants re-
cruited from summer classes at the university. The final sample
consisted of 56 students (34 female, equally divided between
conditions).
We selected continuations that were not particularly unusual and
that produced an intrusion in subsequent recall by a GSP partici-
pant in Experiment 1. To reflect the two dominant emotions in
continuations of social scenarios in Experiment 1, we chose four
socially anxious continuations of social scenarios (“Wedding Re-
ception,” “Local Club,” “Evening Class,” and “Local Pub”) and
four otherwise negative continuations of social scenarios; eight
neutral or slightly positive continuations of nonsocial scenarios
were also selected. Nonsocial scenarios were included as fillers to
make our interests less salient. All scenarios and continuations are
listed in the Appendix, the nonsocial ones in the first half of the
list. Two social scenarios from Experiment 1 were omitted because
the scenario failed to produce intrusions or because the continua-
tions that produced intrusions were too distinctive; two nonsocial
scenarios were also omitted, to keep the same balance as in
Experiment 1.
Procedure
Participants were randomly assigned to instructions (subject to
equal n). They were told that the computer would present a series
of trials with two parts: The first part described a real-life scenario,
and the second part described an ending to the scenario that was
actually created by a previous participant. Current participants
were asked to read the scenario and then press the space bar to
initiate the display of the ending, which they should read aloud.
The ending appeared at the bottom of the screen. In the imagery
condition, participants were asked to imagine themselves as the
central character performing the actions described in both parts
and to make this image as vivid (clear and lifelike) as possible.
When they pressed the space bar again, the scenario and ending
were replaced by a 7-point rating scale ranging from not at all to
extremely vivid, and participants typed their rating. In the closure
condition, participants were asked to consider that each scenario
could have ended in other ways or that the ending could have
better resolved the ambiguity of the scenario. In this condition, the
rating scale ranged from not at all to very well, and participants
rated the extent to which they thought the ending provided closure
to the situation. As in Experiment 1, the scenarios were random-
ized anew for each participant. Following three practice trials, the
experimenter left the room, and readings were tape recorded to
insure that instructions were followed.
Following the 3-min digit/symbol-substitution task, the memory
task was announced. On each trial, participants first read the
displayed title and first sentence of the scenario. Then they at-
tempted to recall the remainder of the scenario aloud, having been
told that the main ideas were more important than the exact
wording. Upon pressing the space bar, the instruction to recall the
ending appeared; participants said, “the ending” and then at-
tempted to recall it aloud. The next trial began when the space bar
was pressed a second time. Again, following three practice trials,
the experimenter turned on the recorder and left the room. In a
final task, the scenarios and endings were shown on the same
screen, in random order. Participants were instructed to judge the
likelihood that they would act or react in the same or a similar way
as the description in each ending. Ratings were made on a 7-point
scale ranging from not at all to extremely likely. All computer tasks
were implemented with Superlab Pro software (Version 4.0, Ce-
drus Corp.).
Results and Discussion
Two raters, blind to experimental conditions, independently
classified the recalled social scenarios from 52 participants accord-
ing to whether they contained intrusions reflecting the endings
(averaged   .83). The percentages of intrusions were averaged
across the raters and submitted to an ANOVA, with between-
subjects factors for group (low vs. high SIAS) and instruction
(imagery vs. closure). The interaction was significant, F(1, 52) 
5.52, MSE  129.31, p  .023, 2  .10. Means in Table 5 show
that, compared with closure, imagery instructions encouraged in-
trusions by low-anxious students, F(1, 26) 7.69, MSE 132.32,
p  .010, 2  .23, but not by high-anxious students, p  .604.
The group difference was significant for those with closure in-
structions, F(1, 26) 13.48, MSE 69.97, p .001, 2 .34, but
not imagery instructions, p  .610.
Ratings of identification with the endings of the social scenarios
were also analyzed with the same design; data were missing for
one participant. The significant main effect of group revealed
greater identification by participants with higher SIAS scores, F(1,
Table 5
Distributions and Means in Experiment 2 (and Standard
Deviations)
Group
Imagery Closure
Low
anxious
High
anxious
Low
anxious
High
anxious
Gender 8 F, 6 M 9 F, 5 M 9 F, 5 M 8 F, 6 M
SIAS 9.1 (3.86) 40.4 (6.94) 10.4 (5.36) 40.5 (7.84)
Intrusions 17.4 (15.15) 14.7 (12.16) 5.4 (5.93) 17.0 (10.23)
Identification 3.4 (0.84) 4.8 (0.65) 3.6 (1.07) 4.2 (0.93)
Note. The last measure is missing data from one participant in the
low-anxious closure condition; otherwise, n  14. SIAS  Social Inter-
action Anxiety Scale; intrusions  percentage of the 8 social scenarios for
which recall included an intrusion reflecting the meaning of the ending;
identification  rating of similarity of the ending to one’s own actions or
reactions (7-point scale).
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51)  19.52, MSE  0.78, p  .001, 2  .28. The means in the
last row of Table 5 show that these ratings did not differ according
to instructions, and the interaction was not significant, p  .110.
From the standpoint of the issues motivating this experiment, it
is clear that intrusions of the sort produced in Experiment 1 by the
GSP participants can also be produced when nonanxious individ-
uals recall social scenarios with emotional continuations. Students
with lower SIAS scores made errors at the same level as those with
higher SIAS scores, but only if they constructed vivid images of
themselves as the main characters of the scenarios. Although we
have no direct evidence, it seems likely that the socially anxious
students in Experiment 2 automatically imagined themselves in
these scenarios, regardless of instruction to consider closure. In
general, these results suggest that both the availability of emotion-
ally negative interpretations and vivid images contribute to the
memory biases observed in Experiment 1. Of course, it is not
possible to compare these levels of intrusions with those produced
by GSP participants on the basis of their idiosyncratic interpreta-
tions. Nevertheless, the fact that imagery instructions elevated
intrusions produced by students otherwise less inclined to identify
with the main characters does suggest that imagery played an
important role in Experiment 1 as it has in other studies of
cognitive bias in social anxiety (see Hirsch, Clark, & Mathews,
2006).
General Discussion
Experiment 1 is one of the first studies to provide evidence for
a connection between interpretation and memory biases in GSP.
Consistent with the existing literature on interpretation bias, so-
cially anxious individuals generated more socially anxious and
otherwise negative continuations to social scenarios than did their
nonanxious counterparts. Moreover, errors in recalling those sce-
narios reflected the nature of their initial emotionally negative
interpretations, thereby blurring the distinction between memory
for the scenario and memory for their own thoughts and interpre-
tations and providing a new way to understand memory biases in
social anxiety. In Experiment 2, undergraduate students who read
continuations provided by the GSP participants produced the same
kind of memory intrusions if they were instructed to imagine
themselves as the main characters or if they scored high on
self-reported social anxiety.
The Present Findings
Our first hypothesis was that the GSP participants would exhibit
an interpretation bias for ambiguous social scenarios. The socially
anxious participants did indeed generate more socially anxious
continuations, and they also generated more other negative and
fewer neutral continuations of social scenarios than did the control
participants. Finally, the GSP participants tended to generate fewer
positive interpretations than did the controls (although the effect
merely approached significance). In general, these results are con-
sistent with the interpretation bias literature in social phobia (e.g.,
Amir et al., 2005; Brendle & Wenzel, 2004; Mellings & Alden,
2000).
Approximately one-fourth of the interpretations made by the
GSP participants were categorized as socially anxious. This seem-
ingly low number is related to the characteristics of our materials
in a way that reflects the fundamental nature of the research
design. The 10 social scenarios represented a variety of social
situations (e.g., speaking in public, having an interview, going to
a social club). Because a diagnosis of GSP encompasses a wide
spectrum of social fears, it is likely that each GSP participant’s
feared social situations corresponded to only a small number of the
scenarios used in this study. (In recruiting the GSP participants,
however, we ensured that they had experienced social phobia for
at least two different social situations in the past 2 months.) Thus,
the breadth of the scenarios used for the purpose of capturing
individual differences likely minimized the average number of
socially anxious interpretations and subsequent associated intru-
sions.
Supporting our primary prediction, GSP participants produced
more source-monitoring errors during the recall of social scenarios
than did participants in the control group, who tended to produce
more intrusions overall regardless of meaning. It is not the case,
therefore, that the GSP participants were simply more willing to
make errors in recall; consequently, a response-bias explanation
can be ruled out. Source-monitoring errors were more frequent for
the GSP participants when their continuations of the social sce-
narios had been socially anxious or otherwise negative (albeit not
strictly at the level of statistical significance in the case of socially
anxious continuations). This outcome is partly a function of op-
portunity; because the GSP participants produced more emotion-
ally negative continuations, there were more available for confu-
sion with memory for the actual scenarios. Although opportunity is
sometimes seen as the cause of artifact, we stress its role as
foundation for memory bias, which in turn contributes to the
maintenance of the disorder. GSP participants are more likely to
make emotional interpretations of ambiguous or benign social
situations, and these interpretations provide grounds for source
confusions in later recall. Thus, negatively distorted memories,
rooted in such opportune interpretations, encourage avoidance of
future social situations (see Hackmann, Clark, & McManus, 2000).
In Experiment 2, opportunity was standardized through the
provision of endings to the scenarios. From this experiment we
learned that naturally occurring interpretation biases are not nec-
essary to the construction of source-monitoring errors. Because we
assume that people are infrequently provided with interpretations
of ambiguity in the real world, however, opportunity is still an
ecologically important feature of the phenomenon. The other les-
son from Experiment 2 is that self-focused imagery contributes
substantially to the production of source-monitoring errors. And
indeed there is reason to believe that self-focused imagery actually
encourages biased interpretations in the first place (see Hirsch,
Mathews, & Clark, 2006). Therefore, the availability of negative
interpretations might not be sufficient to the production of source-
monitoring errors, even for socially anxious individuals, unless
self-focused imagery is also engaged. Future investigations should
examine the possibility that self-generated emotional interpreta-
tions reduce initial attention to details that would facilitate source
monitoring, particularly in the context of self-referential imagery.
In that regard, however, we note that the GSP participants in
Experiment1 recalled as many idea units as did the controls.
Future investigations should also test the specificity of the
differences observed in these experiments. We did not include
scenarios that were ambiguous in features other than social threat.
Although frameworks for understanding social anxiety do not
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anticipate biases in interpretation or recall of events that can be
interpreted as physically threatening, for example, it is possible
that source-monitoring errors would extend in ways that reflect
diagnostic overlap, perhaps especially with regard to potential
depressive interpretations.
Memory Bias in Social Anxiety
There are several possible reasons why Experiment 1 is one of
the few to find evidence of memory biases in socially anxious
individuals. First, our procedure began with an interaction with a
confederate, which may have helped activate cognitive biases
among the GSP participants. In one of the few other studies
obtaining evidence of biased recall in social anxiety, Mellings and
Alden (2000) also began their sessions with a confederate inter-
action. Mansell and Clark (1999), too, employed a similar real-life
scenario concerning fear of public speaking. It is possible that an
ongoing social situation is necessary to the production of
interpretation-based memory biases in social phobia.
Unlike other studies of recall bias in social anxiety, we exam-
ined interpretations and memory interactively, as part of the central
rationale for the study. This point is likely to be important in
understanding why evidence for biased memory is found infre-
quently in other studies. For example, in a number of investiga-
tions, participants were asked to recall single words or sentences
without reference to interpretation, usually because their meaning
was unambiguous (e.g., Amir et al., 2000; Becker et al., 1999;
Cloitre et al., 1995; Studies 1 and 2 by Rapee et al., 1994; Rinck
& Becker, 2005; Sanz, 1996). A few investigators (e.g., Brendle &
Wenzel, 2004; Wenzel et al., 2005) examined both interpretive and
memory biases for the same materials but tested only memory for
factual details. Although the attempt to separate the biases is
certainly justifiable, our source-monitoring perspective suggests
that evidence for memory biases in social phobia rests on the use
of a paradigm capable of revealing influences from interpretations.
Interestingly, Lundh and Ost (1997) provide early evidence from
such a paradigm. Social phobic participants recognized more faces
that they had previously judged to be critical (instead of accept-
ing), whereas controls exhibited the opposite pattern. Methods that
reveal interactions between interpretation and memory provide
more ecologically valid analogs for the operation of interpretation
and memory biases outside the laboratory, where the meaning to
be found in social events is often ambiguous.
Our emphasis on interpretive aspects of recall is consistent with
recent evidence on phenomenal aspects of autobiographical mem-
ory in social phobia. D’Argembeau, Van der Linden, d’Acremont,
and Mayers (2006), for example, found that compared with con-
trols, participants with social phobia rated their memories of social
events as containing fewer details; these memories made more
references to self, but they also tended to reflect an observer’s
perspective on self. Similarly, Coles, Turk, and Heimberg (2002)
examined GSP and control participants’ memory for role-played
interactions at two time points: the same day and 3 weeks later.
Initially, memories in the GSP group were rated more in accord
with an observer’s perspective and less with a field perspective
than memories in the control group, and this difference increased
3 weeks later. Clearly, qualitative aspects of memories warrant
more attention in future studies of cognitive functioning in social
anxiety.
Reality Monitoring, Source Monitoring, and
Reconstructive Memory
Our contribution to the literature on memory biases is based on
reasoning about errors in reality-monitoring—errors in remember-
ing the source of the event in question (“Did I experience it or
merely imagine it?”). In fact, our procedure for the memory task
encouraged the consideration of source, in that participants were
required to distinguish aloud on each trial the line that separated
the scenario from the continuation. It is important to realize,
however, that the two memory sources relevant to Experiment 1
were printed descriptions of scenarios and self-invented continu-
ations, stated aloud. Source monitoring likely involved attempts to
remember descriptions as they appeared on the monitor instead of
actual events with good perceptual detail, as would be the case in
real-world reality monitoring. Words on a monitor are indeed
externally generated memory representations, but they might be
more easily separated from the products of one’s imagination than
would be the case for actual events. Alternatively, our participants’
source discriminations were complicated by the fact that we in-
structed them to see themselves as the central character in the
scenario and asked them to speak continuations aloud. In Exper-
iment 2, source monitoring required participants to distinguish
between two printed descriptions. In short, our demonstrations of
source-monitoring errors imprecisely model real-world reality-
monitoring tasks, likely underestimating potential confusions in
some ways and overestimating them in others.
The real-world problem of reality monitoring is more clearly
approached from the perspective initially established by Johnson
and Raye (1981), who proposed that internally generated memo-
ries are characterized by records of the cognitive processes that
produce them (e.g., memory for having actually made an interpre-
tation), whereas externally generated memories are characterized
in part by richer perceptual attributes. In social anxiety, tendencies
to construct vibrant visual images of interpretations would make
source confusions more likely. Any tendency not to monitor one’s
thoughts would also add to source confusions by creating dim
records of the process (not the product) of interpretation. By
considering these and other memory attributes, applications of a
reality-monitoring analysis to problems in social phobia offer rich
possibilities for further research.
Conclusions
Our results highlight the connection between socially anxious
individuals’ biases in interpretation and memory. Speculating
about the tendency to blur the lines between these phenomena,
Hirsch, Clark, and Mathews (2006) wrote: “Even if the original
event was really neutral or only mildly negative, but was inter-
preted at the time in a catastrophic way, then the stored memory is
also likely to contain elements of the catastrophic interpretation,
perhaps incorporated into the remembered image of the event” (p.
230). Here, we offer empirical support for their speculation; so-
cially anxious individuals’ biased interpretations do affect what
they remember about a social interaction. And these distorted
memories are therefore available to color future interpretations of
benign situations.
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Appendix
Materials in Experiment 2
Scenario Ending
Your Exam Review: You draw up a plan for your exam revision and encourage yourself to stick to it.
The next day you come home and go straight to your room. When your roommate comes home
you are working.
I say hi to my roommate and go back to
doing my work.
The Gift: Your aunt sends you a hat for Christmas. Her choice of a gift is unusual, because you do
not wear hats. You try it on; the hat is warm because it is thermal.
I forget that I do not like hats and just
keep it on because it’s comfortable.
The Dining Set: You inherit an old dining table and chairs and decide to restore them to their former
glory. You spend hours in the garage working on them. When you have finished, you bring them
into the house.
I put various decorations on top of the
table.
Your New Hobby: You decide to take up pottery as a hobby. You go to the art store and buy all the
materials. When you work with the clay you think you should have bought an apron.
I changed into an old t-shirt and decided
to get an apron the next day.
The Exercise Regimen: You want to start jogging again and plan to go out every morning before
work. On the first morning, you have run a short distance before you notice that it’s chilly. You
forgot to bring gloves.
I pick up the pace so I can get my
adrenaline going and feel warm.
The Video Camera: You buy a new video camera and take it home. The camera doesn’t work, so you
go to the store to get a refund. When you look into the bag the receipt is missing.
I’ll see if the clerk can take it back just
using my credit card.
The Book: You begin reading a book that you recently found around your house. One afternoon you
are reading it while sitting in the recliner. The doorbell rings so you put the book down.
I decided not to answer it, the book is too
good.
Your New CD: You heard a song on the radio and went out to buy the CD right away. When you
return home you listen to it on your stereo and turn the volume up. After a few songs, you regret
the purchase.
I’ll sell the CD back to the store that buys
used CDs.
The Wedding Reception: Your friend asks you to give a speech at her wedding reception. You prepare
some remarks and when the time comes, get to your feet. As you speak, some people in the
audience start to laugh.
I’ll wrap up my speech as quickly as I
can, as I fear that they are laughing at
me.
The Local Club: You are invited to attend a social at a local club, whose members you don’t know
very well. As you approach the door you hear loud conversation. When you enter the room, it
stops.
I guess I look pretty weird in the club;
I’m not the typical person you’d find at
a club.
The Job Interview: You see a job advertised that you would really like, so you apply and are asked to
interview. At the interview, you answer the questions as well as you can. That evening, you think
that your answers decided the outcomes.
I could have done better. I’m pretty sure I
won’t get hired.
Meeting a Friend: In the street you bump into an old friend you haven’t seen for a long time, but she
is in a rush. You arrange to meet later in a bar. You arrive on time and a few minutes later she is
still not there.
I knew I shouldn’t have come. This
happens all the time.
Your Birthday: It is your birthday and you wake up looking forward to your day. You wonder how
many friends will call to wish you happy birthday. By the time you leave for work, no one has
called.
I feel deflated and disappointed but go
back to work anyway and hope that
someone remembers my birthday.
The House-Warming Party: Your neighbor has a house warming party and you are invited. You
arrive to find many other guests whom you do not know. You try talking to some of them, and you
get an impression of their interest in your conversation.
I hate these parties. There is never anyone
good to talk to.
The Evening Class: You have just started going to an evening class in philosophy. The instructor asks
a question and no one answers, so he looks directly at you. You answer the question, aware of how
your voice must sound.
I realize my voice sounds high pitched
because I am nervous so I intentionally
lower it and speak a little more slowly.
The Local Pub: You are with a group of new friends at a local pub. You start to tell a joke you heard
recently, and everyone looks at you. Their expressions change when you get to the punch line.
I didn’t tell the joke right. I guess I’m not
a very good joke teller.
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